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This paper considers a two-period model of market entry with horizontally differentiated
products and switching costs. Conditions that are conducive to a competitive environment in
the second period are shown to yield a less competitive outcome in the first period. That is,
when the marginal cost of a foreign entrant is relatively low, the first-period output of a
domestic monopolist is relatively low as well.
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The proliferation of trade liberalization through both economic integration
(e.g., the European Union) and preferential trade agreements (e.g., NAFTA)
has spawned a vast literature on the implications of trade liberalization. In
particular, in a single-period setting, pro-competitive gains from trade due to
foreign ﬁrms’ entry into the domestic market have been studied extensively.1
It is well known that the entry of a cost-competitive (i.e., low marginal cost)
foreign ﬁrm yields a highly competitive outcome. As yet, however, little
attention has been paid to the implications of trade liberalization in the
context of products with switching costs.
In a model with switching costs, it is more costly for consumers (or whole-
salers) to buy from one producer in one period and from another producer
in the next.2 In the context of trade liberalization, switching costs include
transaction and information costs for import wholesalers.3 Important trans-
action costs result from diﬀerences in languages and customs. If a wholesaler
has been buying a good (e.g., steel) from a domestic ﬁrm and decides in-
stead to buy from a foreign ﬁrm, then the wholesaler must hire new per-
sonnel that are familiar with that country’s language and customs. Another
transaction cost is that of negotiating a contract or agreement with the new
supplier. Contracting costs with a new foreign supplier are usually higher
than contracting costs with a domestic supplier. Switching costs are thus
an important factor in any industry in which the product passes through a
wholesaler’s hands.4
Although the vitality of industries characterized by switching costs is
closely related to trade liberalization, the literature on trade liberalization
is almost exclusively focused on products without switching costs. Since the
role of switching costs is ampliﬁed in the globalized world, it seems important
to explore the impact of liberalization in the trade of products with switching
1 See, for example, Brander (1981), Markusen (1981).
2 See Klemperer (1987a, 1987b).
3 See To (1994) for discussion.
4 See Klemperer (1995) for surveys of the relevant literature. For the strategic export
policy context, see To (1994).
1costs.
As its primary contribution, this paper examines how trade liberalization
(i.e., the entry of a foreign ﬁrm into the domestic market) aﬀects the behavior
of a domestic monopolist in the presence of switching costs. For these pur-
poses Iconstruct a simple two-period market-entrance model with switching
costs. It will be shown that a competitive environment in the second period
caused by a foreign entrant’s relatively low marginal costs is associated with
a less competitive outcome in the ﬁrst period because the domestic monop-
olist will produce less. The results diﬀer from those obtained in standard
single-period models of trade liberalization in that the inclusion of switching
costs drastically changes the impact of trade liberalization.
2 The model
Consider a two-period market-entrance game with horizontally diﬀerentiated
products and switching costs. Consumers in the domestic market are uni-
formly located on the interval [0,1]. Consumers incur a transportation cost
of one per unit of distance. In the ﬁrst period, the domestic monopolist,
which is located at 0 (we call this Firm 0), is already in the market. Firm 0
chooses a price (p1
0) and collects the ﬁrst period’s proﬁts. At the beginning
of the second period, trade is liberalized and a foreign ﬁrm, which is located
at 1 (we call this Firm 1), enters the domestic market. Subsequently, ﬁrms
simultaneously set prices (p2
0 and p2
1), realize their proﬁts, and the game ends.
We assume no discounting.
The model follows Klemperer (1987a) and To (1994) closely in regard
to the implementation of switching costs. In each period, consumers have
reservation value r and a perfectly inelastic demand for one unit of the good.5
Assume that, after a consumer has purchased from one supplier, it is too
costly to switch to another supplier. This assumption is made to ensure that
demand curves are smooth. At the end of the ﬁrst period, mass v ∈ (0,1] of
uniformly and randomly chosen consumers leaves the market and is replaced
by new consumers. A consumer that leaves the market in the second period
5 Considerations are restricted to cases in which r<2.
2does not incur any costs and gets a second-period payoﬀ of zero. The turnover
rate serves as a substitute measure for the magnitude of switching costs – a
high rate of turnovers implies that switching costs are small, on average.
Firms have no ﬁxed costs and constant marginal costs. Firm 0’s marginal
costs are normalized to zero, while c represents Firm 1’s marginal costs. As is
usual when solving for sub-game perfect equilibria, the analysis begins with
the second period.
2.1 The Second Period
In the second period, consumers minimize their second-period costs given
that they are either locked into Firm 0 or that they are new consumers with
no previous ties. First consider the v new consumers. If new consumer i
buys from Firm 0, i’s total cost is Firm 0’s price plus i’ s transportation cost:
p0
2+i. Similarly, i’s cost of buying from Firm 1 is p1
2+(1ʵi). New consumer
i will buy from Firm 0 when the cost of buying from Firm 0 is less than the
cost of buying from Firm 1. Let ˆ i be the new consumer who is indiﬀerent
between buying from Firm 0 and Firm 1: ˆ i =1 /2+( p1
2 − p0
2)/2. For any
i<ˆ i , consumer i will buy from Firm 0 and for any i>ˆ i , consumer i will
buy from Firm 1, hence Firm 0 sells to vˆ i new consumers and Firm 1 sells
to v(1 ʵˆ i) new consumers.
Now consider the 1 − v old consumers. All old consumers purchase from
Firm 0 as long as the price plus the transportation cost is no greater than
the reservation value: Firm 0 sells to mass (1−v)q1 of old consumers, where
q1 represents Firm 0’s output in the ﬁrst period.
Firm 0’s second-period demand is equal to the sum of the mass of the
new consumers who buy from Firm 0 and the mass of the remaining old


















6 Following Klemperer (1987a, 1987c), I assume that Firm 0 cannot price discriminate
against its repeat customers.














Firms maximize second-period proﬁts through the choice of prices, given
















Using (1) through (4) to get ﬁrm j’s ﬁrst order condition and then solving

























































(1 + (1 − v)(2q − 1) + 2v(1 + c)). (10)
















42.2 The First Period
To simplify the analysis, let us assume that, in the ﬁrst-period, consumers
purchase from Firm 0 as long as the price plus the transportation cost is no
greater than the reservation value. This implies that p1+q1 = r holds. Thus,
Firm 0’s ﬁrst-period proﬁt becomes:
π
0
1 = p1q1 =( r − q1)q1. (12)
Firm 0 maximizes the total proﬁt through the choice of its ﬁrst-period
price, p1, knowing how its ﬁrst-period choice will aﬀect decisions and proﬁts





















Note that the sign of the denominator becomes positive if v>ˆ v ≡ [25 −
(369)1/2]/16 ≈ 0.362 holds. Equation (14) implies the interesting impact of
trade liberalization in the presence of switching costs.
Proposition: Suppose that the turnover rate is in the range of ˆ v ≤ v ≤ 1.A s
the foreign entrant’s marginal costs become higher, the domestic monopolist’s
ﬁrst-period output increases.
In other words, given that the turnover rate is suﬃciently large, the more
cost-competitive the foreign entrant is, the lower the incentive to capture
consumers in the ﬁrst period [i.e., (dq1/dc) > 0]. This result diﬀers from those
obtained in trade models without switching costs. In those models, trade
with cost-competitive foreign ﬁrms makes the market more competitive. In
this model with switching costs, however, the promise of competitive market
5conditions in the future period makes the current period less competitive.
The principle involved is that, since the motivation to capture consumers in
the ﬁrst period is to shift proﬁts away from the foreign entrant in the second
period, a less-competitive domestic ﬁrm (which has a lower incentive to shift
proﬁts) will choose a lower output level in the ﬁrst period.7
3 Concusions
In a two-period market-entry model with switching costs, it has been shown
that conditions that cause a more competitive environment in the second
period (i.e., relatively low marginal costs for a foreign entrant) yields a less
competitive outcome in the ﬁrst period. The interaction between trade lib-
eralization and ﬁrm behavior in the presence of switching costs is crucial: if
the magnitude of turnover rate is substantial, some of the pro-competitive
gains from trade liberalization in the future period must be oﬀset by a less-
competitive outcome in the current period.
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